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Abstract
Passwords play a critical role in online authentication. Unfortunately, passwords suffer from
two seemingly intractable problems: password cracking and password theft. In this paper, we
propose PasswordAgent, a new password hashing mechanism that utilizes both a salt repository
and a browser plug-in to secure web logins with strong passwords. Password hashing is a tech-
nique that allows users to remember simple low-entropy passwords and have them hashed to create
high-entropy secure passwords. PasswordAgent generates strong passwords by enhancing the hash
function with a large random salt. With the support of a salt repository, it gains a much stronger
security guarantee than existing mechanisms. PasswordAgent is not vulnerable to offline attacks,
and it provides stronger protection against password theft. Moreover, PasswordAgent offers usabil-
ity advantages over existing hash-based mechanisms, while maintaining users’ familiar password
entry paradigm. We build a prototype of PasswordAgent and conduct usability experiments.
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1. Introduction
Passwords remain the most common security method to authenticate or verify a user’s online
identity. They provide a powerful guard against unauthorized access to systems and data, and are
ubiquitously used in various online activities such as shopping, banking, communication, and learn-
ing. User authentication via password relies on the something you know authentication factor [3],
i.e., you know some secret that no one else does. Although two other authentication factors some-
thing you have (e.g., hardware token) and something you are (e.g., fingerprint) have also been rec-
ognized and used in practice, they have not gained a wide acceptance on the Internet, primarily
because of their high cost, limited flexibility, and restricted portability. On the contrary, passwords
are simple, inexpensive, easy to implement, and convenient to use. Consequently, they occupy the
dominant position in online user authentication, and we believe this situation will not change in the
foreseeable future.
Despite their prevalence and importance in online authentication, passwords do have two well-
known and long-standing problems: weak passwords are easy to crack, and passwords are vulner-
able to theft. Password security depends on creating strong passwords and protecting them from
being stolen. A strong password should be sufficiently long, random, and hard to discover by crack-
ers. In contrast, a weak password is usually short, common, and easy to guess. Examples of strong
passwords include “t3wahSetyeT4” and “Tpftcits4Utg!”; and examples of weak passwords include
“susan123” and “password” [6]. Weak passwords suffer from vulnerability to brute-force and dic-
tionary attacks [25]. The dilemma in a password system is that a user will often choose guessable
passwords simply because they are easy to remember [25, 17, 12]. Moreover, no matter how strong
they are, passwords are also vulnerable to theft. One of the most significant threats to online users
are phishing attacks [8, 16], which use social engineering techniques to steal users’ personal identity
data on spoofed websites [2]. In recent years, this type of identity theft has risen sharply and has
cost billion-dollar losses [1]. Other attacks like shoulder surfing [28] and keyloggers [18] can also
steal user passwords, especially in public places such as cybercafes, airports, and libraries.
The above two problems have been further exacerbated by the fact that users have to create and
memorize an increasing number of passwords as they use more and more password-protected online
services. This fact combined with the inherent limitation of human memory force users to revert
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back to insecure habits such as choosing simpler passwords, reusing passwords across different
websites, or even writing down their passwords [32]. A recent large-scale study of web password
usage shows that on average, a user has approximately 6.5 passwords shared across 25 different
websites, and the majority of users choose weak passwords that contain only lower case letters [19].
To address these problems and enhance online password security, a number of techniques have
been proposed. For example, password managers generate strong passwords and automatically
store them in a local database [9, 4]. Single sign-on systems allow users to log into many websites
using one account, which reduces the number of passwords a user must remember [10]. Graphical
passwords enable users to click on images to authenticate themselves [22, 15]. However, these
solutions all have their own limitations. Password managers store passwords on a fixed computer
and thus lack mobility; single sign-on systems place too much trust on a centralized system and
thus are vulnerable to single-point failure [23]; and graphical passwords, although proposed as an
alternative to traditional text-based passwords, are still hampered by security and usability concerns
[14, 29].
A promising approach to obtain secure online passwords is password hashing, in which hashed
passwords are sent to remote websites instead of plain-text passwords. Password hashing is very
attractive for a few reasons: it is lightweight, convenient to use, increases password strength, and
can defend against phishing attacks. This approach has been utilized in projects such as the Lucent
Personal Web Assistant (LPWA) [20], PwdHash [26], Password Multiplier [21], and Passpet [33].
However, these systems still have security limitations which will be discussed in Section 2. More-
over, password hashing systems, if not carefully designed and implemented, suffer from usability
problems that may directly lead to security exposures [13].
In this paper, we present PasswordAgent, a new password hashing mechanism that utilizes both
a Salt Repository server and a browser plug-in Agent to enhance online password security. The Salt
Repository stores a list of salts for each registered user while the Agent provides the user interface,
salt retrieval, and hashing functionality. When a plain-text password needs to be protected for a
specific website, the user simply activates the Agent and enters the plain-text password. The Agent
concatenates the plain-text password and the website specific salt to deterministically generate the
site password via a hash function.
The contribution of PasswordAgent to the password hashing approach lies in the following as-
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pects. First, it provides a stronger security guarantee by using randomly generated and securely
stored salts. Second, it improves phishing protection by giving users accurate warnings if they at-
tempt to enter protected account information on an unprotected website. Moreover, even if phishers
obtain the plain-text passwords by using subtle techniques such as Javascript attacks or “spoofed
password field in Flash” [26], they still cannot access users’ accounts because they do not have
the salts. Third, as long as the password to the Salt Repository server is not observed by an at-
tacker, PasswordAgent also reduces the risks of shoulder surfing attacks. Finally, a few usability
suggestions made in [13] are incorporated into PasswordAgent, providing usability advantages over
existing solutions.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. We describe existing password hashing
solutions in Section 2. We present the design of PasswordAgent in Section 3 and analyze its security
and usability in Section 4. We detail the implementation and usability evaluation of PasswordAgent
in Section 5. We discuss the limitations of PasswordAgent in Section 6, and finally we conclude in
Section 7.
2. Related Work
In this section, we highlight the contributions of the Lucent Personal Web Assistant (LPWA) [20]
and three recent systems: PwdHash [26], Password Multiplier [21], and Passpet [33]. These existing
systems exemplify the concept and value of password hashing in online user authentication, and are
the most related to our proposed PasswordAgent.
LPWA is an HTTP proxy providing data anonymity services to users. To a user, LPWA generates
secure, consistent, and pseudonymous usernames, passwords, and email aliases for different web-
sites based on three inputs: a UserID, a universal password to the proxy, and a destination website
address. Using LPWA, users can protect their real identities and weed out junk email based on the
recipient email address. LPWA was successful before, but now has serious limitations. LPWA does
not support HTTPS, but the identities that need to be protected the most are those that are transmit-
ted via HTTPS. LPWA also requires users to fully trust the proxy server, which knows all the login
credentials to the destination servers, resulting in security and privacy concerns.
PwdHash is a browser extension that transparently creates a different password for each site,
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improving web password security and defending against phishing attacks. PwdHash addresses a
few challenges of implementing password hashing as a secure and transparent extension to web
browsers. In particular, PwdHash uses the source domain name as a salt and sends a hashed pass-
word to the remote site. However, PwdHash, as acknowledged by the authors, is vulnerable to two
major kinds of attacks. One is a dictionary attack on the hashed passwords. This vulnerability
is due to three factors: a phishing site can obtain hashed passwords, PwdHash uses MD5, a very
fast hashing algorithm, and the salt is publicly known. The second vulnerability of PwdHash is its
susceptibility to advanced phishing attacks, such as using Flash objects or focus stealing.
As a browser extension, Password Multiplier can generate strengthened passwords for an arbi-
trary number of accounts while requiring the user to memorize only a single short password. It uses
the same three inputs as LPWA: a UserID, a master password, and a destination domain name. The
key contribution of Password Multiplier is using a strengthened hash function to deterministically
generate high-entropy passwords. However, the main problem with Password Multiplier is that all
the derived passwords will be known to attackers if the master password is stolen. At present, it is
possible for an attacker to steal a master password through a keylogger or other spyware. Moreover,
changing a password for a specific site is complicated because Password Multiplier requires users
to remember additional information. Changing the master password becomes extremely tedious
because the password on every site needs to be updated.
Built upon Password Multiplier and Petname Tool [7], Passpet turns a single master password
into distinct passwords for different websites and uses petnames to help users recognize phishing
attempts. In order to generate correct passwords, Passpet relies on a remote server to store site label
files. However, Passpet has the same drawback as Password Multiplier in terms of master password
vulnerability. Changing the master password is still very tedious because a user needs to migrate
passwords for every site. In addition, its remote storage server is vulnerable to various malicious
attacks, which is acknowledged by the authors. We compare PasswordAgent with these existing
systems and detail the advantages of PasswordAgent in Section 4.
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Figure 1: The architecture of PasswordAgent.
3. Design of PasswordAgent
3.1. Overview
PasswordAgent consists of two major components: the Salt Repository and the Agent. The
Repository stores salt lists enabling PasswordAgent to function transparently across either enter-
prise networks or the Internet. The Agent is used to retrieve the salts from the Repository, provide
visual security indicators, and generate site specific passwords. In our design, each enterprise net-
work maintains a Salt Repository providing salt storage services for its users. To achieve high
reliability and scalability, it is possible that multiple servers function as the Salt Repository within
one enterprise network. Usually, each user has a primary Salt Repository, but it is possible that
one user has salt lists stored in multiple repositories. In contrast, the Agent is associated with each
individual web browser as a browser extension. The basic architecture of the PasswordAgent is
shown in Figure 1. Before continuing, it is important to have a grasp of the five different types of
passwords discussed in this paper. Table 1 describes these passwords in detail.
To facilitate the deployment of the Salt Repository inside an enterprise network, the Repository
can be integrated with any accessible web service that implements the Repository Interface. The
web server can be publicly accessed via the Internet so that users can retrieve their salt lists from
any location. The interface is a simple XML protocol that allows a user to register an account, save
a domain and its associated salt, and retrieve a list of domains and salts. All the information in the
salt list is encrypted before being stored. This not only guards against a compromised Repository,
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Term Description Example
Plain-text Password The user’s password. “secret”
Protected Password The plain-text password but with additional data (either the ac-
tivation hotkey or activation prefix) added to notify PasswordA-
gent that a site password needs to be generated.
“@@secret” OR
[F2]“secret”
Site Password The unique password generated for a site based on the site salt
and plain-text password.
“2T7fYe10”
Agent Password The password used to generate the Repository Password and de-
crypt the salt list, it is only entered at the beginning of a session.
“likk@#0”
Repository Password A password generated from the Agent Password that is used to
authenticate to the Salt Repository.
“1d@7Ai#”
Table 1: Password terminology.
Figure 2: Data stored by the Salt Repository.
but also alleviates privacy concerns by making the domains inaccessible to anyone but the user. An
overview of the data stored by the Salt Repository is illustrated in Figure 2.
The Agent directly integrates into a web browser, allowing a user to generate passwords. The
Agent is a variation of PwdHash for Firefox, but creating plug-ins for other major browsers should
be a relatively simple task.
A PasswordAgent session begins like a normal browsing session with the user launching a web
browser. The user must then log into the Agent with a username and Agent password. The Agent
then transparently determines which Repository to use, and loads the user’s salt list from it. The
user continues to browse the web until a login form is encountered. Once the user enters a pass-
word field, the Agent indicates whether the current site is registered or not. If the user activates
PasswordAgent, a unique site password will be generated by hashing the site’s salt and the entered
plain-text password. The login form is submitted with the site password, and the user logs into the
site.
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Figure 3: Basic user flow.
3.2. User Flow
Before using the PasswordAgent service, the user must register with a Repository and install the
Agent. Registration consists of selecting a username and Agent password. Because the Agent is
Repository agnostic, the username must provide enough information to determine which Repository
to use. In consideration of this, all PasswordAgent usernames take the form of username@domain
where domain is the domain name that the Repository belongs to. For example, a user who has the
username jsmith and utilizes the institution of XYZ’s PasswordAgent service would use the login
jsmith@xyz.edu. The Agent can then locate the Repository at passwordagent.xyz.edu. This ap-
proach requires minimal memorization for a user, and allows for easy deployment and configuration
of the Repository.
The Agent encrypts all the information that it stores in the Repository, so there is a requirement
for both an encryption key and a password to authenticate to the Repository. To avoid having the
user memorize two secrets, the Agent password is used as the encryption key and the Repository
password is generated by hashing the full username (including the domain) and the Agent password
together:
PasswordRepository = SHA256(PasswordAgent||Username) (1)
EncryptedSalt = AESPasswordAgent(P laintextSalt) (2)
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Figure 4: Toolbar displaying the status of PasswordAgent.
Since the Repository never knows the Agent password of a user, it cannot decrypt the stored in-
formation. In order to guarantee the integrity of the salt list, the Agent also stores a MAC calculated
as:
MAC = HMAC − SHA256PasswordAgent (Domain1||Salt1
||Domain2||Salt2||...||Domainn||Saltn) (3)
Registration can be accomplished either with automatic enrollment by a network administrator or
via a web form provided by the Repository. Once registered for an account, a user would then need
to install the browser plug-in. After installation, the user is ready to log in and begin a browsing
session. An overview of a PasswordAgent session is given in Figure 3.
3.2.1. Login
When a web browser (e.g., Firefox) is first launched, the Agent lacks a salt list and is unable to
protect any passwords. The user must authenticate to the Repository via a login dialog. A toolbar
button displayed by the Agent allows the user to enter the login dialog as shown in Figure 4.
Once the user enters a username and Agent password, the Agent determines the location of the
Repository based on the domain portion of the username, generates the Repository password, and
retrieves the salt list from the Repository. If successful, the salt list is decrypted using the user’s
Agent password and the MAC is verified. Should the MAC determine that the salt list has been
tampered with, the user is warned via a dialog and the Agent remains logged out. Otherwise, the
Agent updates the toolbar to reflect the new logged in status and retains the salt list in memory until
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the user logs out or exits the browser. To guard against fraudulent Repositories, all communication
is performed over HTTPS. Because the Repository has to identify itself via an SSL certificate, the
Agent is protected from being tricked into divulging the Repository password.
3.2.2. Browsing
If the user enters a password field during the process of web browsing, the Agent toolbar changes
to inform the user whether or not the current site is registered. A site is considered registered if it
has a salt associated with it, as shown in Figure 5(a), and unregistered if it does not, as shown in
Figure 5(b). This allows the user to decide whether or not to enter a protected password.
(a) (b)
Figure 5: User focused password fields: (a) on a protected site, (b) on an unprotected site.
3.2.3. Password Protection
The password input mechanism of the Agent is similar to that of PwdHash. In order to notify the
Agent that a site password should be generated, the user enters a protected password. A protected
password is created by either prefixing the plain-text password with @@ or by pressing a hotkey
(F2). For example, a user who wishes to protect the plain-text password “secret” would type the
protected password “@@secret” which would cause PasswordAgent to generate a site password.
When a protected password is entered, PasswordAgent captures all keystrokes before they appear
on the page, so Javascript keyloggers cannot steal the plain-text password. Once the user leaves the
password field, the protected password is analyzed to reveal the plain-text password (by removing
the @@ prefix) and hashed together with the site’s salt to create the site password. The site specific
password is generated using the SHA256 hash function:
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PasswordSite = SHA256(PasswordPlaint−text||SaltSite) (4)
The main reason for using either the @@ prefix or the F2 hotkey is to let a user explicitly inform
the hashing mechanism where to intercept the plain-text password. This guarantees that the data in
other input fields will not be incorrectly hashed. The prefix @@ is chosen, because it is extremely
unlikely that it will appear in a normal context. This enables PasswordAgent to scan the keystream
and interpret @@ as an indicator to activate password protection. F2 is selected as a hotkey since it
is currently not mapped to any functionality in Firefox [26].
3.2.4. Site Registration
To create a site password for a website, the site must first be registered in order to have a salt
associated with it. If a user attempts to generate a site password via the prefix or hotkey mechanism
on a site that has not yet been registered, an instructional dialog will appear. The dialog walks the
user through registering the site with PasswordAgent. The dialog first confirms that the user wants
to register the site with PasswordAgent, and hasn’t accidentally triggered password protection. The
user is then given a list of already registered sites as shown in Figure 6. The user is asked if the
target site appears in this list. If it does, then the target site is actually a phishing attempt because
it appears to be a registered site but in reality is from a different domain. The user is warned and
prompted to navigate away. If the target site is not listed, the user is asked if he or she has an account
with the target site or is creating a new account. Different instructions are displayed based on the
user’s response:
If the user has an existing account with the target site, that account must be migrated to use Pass-
wordAgent. Migration is achieved by: (1) logging in with the plain-text password, (2) navigating
to the change password page, and (3) entering the new protected password. A salt will then be
generated, encrypted, and sent to the Salt Repository along with the updated MAC.
If the user is creating a new account on the unregistered site, then the user simply has to enter a
protected password on the site registration form. The salt is generated, the new MAC for the salt list
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Figure 6: Information dialog that assists users in recognizing phishing attacks.
is calculated, and both are sent to the Repository for storage. The new salt is then used to generate
the site password.
3.2.5. Multiple Accounts on One Site
A user can have multiple accounts on a single site, for example, someone may have two Gmail
accounts. PasswordAgent is compatible with this scenario, as it can use the site’s salt to hash both
passwords. In this case, password uniqueness cannot be guaranteed because if the user selects the
same password for both accounts, the protected password will also be the same. This is a minor
issue, given that it is a relatively rare scenario. This issue also exists in PwdHash and Password
Multiplier. Password protection is provided in that a compromised password on the site with mul-
tiple accounts will only effect that particular site - all other sites are guaranteed to have unique
passwords.
3.2.6. Changing Site Password
The site password can be changed by one of two mechanisms. The first is to change the plain-text
password as one would do with a normal password (i.e., “@@password” to “@@newpassword”).
The Salt Repository does not need to be notified in this case, since the salt remains unchanged. The
new password is protected in the same manner as the old password. This has the advantage of not
requiring the user to learn any new paradigms about changing passwords. The second is to keep the
plain-text password intact but to change the site salt.
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3.2.7. Password Format
Every site has different requirements for passwords. Some sites require at least one non-alphanumeric
character, while others prohibit them entirely [26]. To allow for these different formats, the user’s
plain-text password is examined for clues as to the makeup of a valid site password. If the user does
not include a non-alphanumeric character in the plain-text password, the site password would not
contain one and the site would notify the user of the incorrect composition of the password. Any
changes in the plain-text password will be reflected in the site password, enabling PasswordAgent
to generate valid passwords for all sites without any specific prior knowledge. While this tech-
nique does leak information about the plain-text password [26], it is of little concern because no
information about the salt is revealed. This technique avoids the need to constantly update a list of
composition rules for common sites on the Internet. This also addresses an important usability issue
of users being dissatisfied with site passwords. Users become concerned when sites, like Hotmail,
offer a password strength meter and the site passwords are rated as medium instead of strong [13].
By inspecting plain-text passwords for clues, the indicated strength of a password is directly related
to the strength of the plain-text password. It should be noted that the actual strength of the site pass-
word is greater, even if the password meter indicates they are the same. A user provided character
string has less entropy than a salted and hashed version of that string.
3.2.8. Roaming
Roaming can be achieved in one of two ways. A roaming user can either install the Agent as outlined
before, or site passwords can be generated via a web interface provided by the Repository. The web
interface allows the user to log in and generate passwords for a specific site, which can be copied and
pasted into the login form. This enables users without the ability to install the Agent to still access
their accounts. PwdHash implements a similar web based mechanism for roaming users, however
it is located at a URL that is complex and difficult to memorize [13]. Because the Repository is
located at passwordagent.domain, it is simple to provide the web interface at that address. Doing
this reduces the memory burden as users already know the domain of their Repository as part of
their logins, all they have to do is remember to prepend passwordagent to it.
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LPWA PwdHash Password Multiplier Passpet PasswordAgent
Security
1 Unique Password for Each Site yes yes yes yes yes
2 Resist Offline Attacks - - no no yes
3 Protect Compromised Plain-text Password no no no no yes
4 Protect Compromised Site Password yes yes yes yes yes
5 Basic Phishing Protection yes yes yes yes yes
6 Advanced Phishing Protection no no no yes yes
7 Enhance Shoulder Surfing Protection no no no no yes
8 Secured Remote Storage - - - no yes
9 Adaptation to Faster Computers no no yes yes yes
10 Provide Data Anonymity yes no no no no
Usability
1 Allow Easy Site Password Update yes yes no yes yes
2 Notify if Site is Protected no no no yes yes
3 Support all Site Specific Password Requirements no yes no no yes
4 Minimal Change to Browsing Paradigm yes yes no no yes
5 Easily Switch Storage Servers - - - no yes
6 Requires 3rd Party Server no no no yes yes
Table 2: Comparison of PasswordAgent with four other tools.
4. Security and Usability Analysis
4.1. Security Analysis
The primary goal of PasswordAgent, like other password hashing schemes, is to improve user
security. Here we compare the security of PasswordAgent with those of LPWA, PwdHash, Pass-
word Multiplier, and Passpet in ten different aspects. The comparison results are summarized in
Table 2. A detailed discussion follows, outlining the major security concerns with the existing pass-
word hashing mechanisms.
Unique Passwords: Each password hashing solution generates a unique password for each site,
even if the plain-text password is the same.
Offline Attacks: PasswordAgent is much less vulnerable to offline attacks. Because the salt list
is not stored locally, launching an offline attack to retrieve the salt list is very difficult. Moreover,
the Salt Repository can defend against online attacks by limiting the number of login attempts al-
lowed per minute. Password Multiplier and Passpet are also resistant to offline attacks as long as
the local machine remains uncompromised. However, if an attacker breaches the computer and re-
trieves the cached master password, a relatively inexpensive offline attack can be launched to expose
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every site password. With PasswordAgent, even if the Agent password is stolen, only the salt list is
revealed. The attacker would still need to launch an online attack against the target site to determine
the site password.
Compromised Plain-text Password: In the scenario where the plain-text password is compro-
mised, only PasswordAgent still provides user protection. An attacker would be unable to use the
compromised password, because the random site salt is not known. PwdHash does not have this
advantage, as the salt is the site’s domain name, allowing an attacker to utilize the compromised
password to access the site. Even worse, Password Multiplier and Passpet both use one plain-text
password as a master password to generate all of the site passwords. Should the master password
be compromised, every password protected by Password Multiplier and Passpet will also be com-
promised.
Compromised Site Password: All password hashing schemes claim to protect users when a site
password is compromised. However, PwdHash provides only minimal security in this scenario.
Because PwdHash uses MD5 and a known salt, the domain name, it is possible to launch a brute
force attack on the compromised password. A phisher impersonating a single site could launch a
time-space trade-off attack and feasibly retrieve the plain-text password. In contrast, PasswordA-
gent defends against offline attacks with a large random salt. Assuming that it takes 1ms to calculate
a hash with a 256-bit salt, it would take roughly 1066 years on average to find the plain-text pass-
word. Furthermore, even if attackers are able to recover the plain-text password, they still have to
launch an online brute force attack in order to discover the salt for any other site that uses the same
plain-text password.
Basic Phishing Protection: The nature of hash-based password generation allows all schemes
to provide a basic level of phishing protection. Because each site password is unique, using any
of these password generation tools on a phishing site will not immediately expose the login of the
target site. As previously noted though, the site password can be used in offline attacks to reveal the
plain-text password. LPWA, PwdHash, Password Multiplier, and Passpet all suffer from this prob-
lem. However, PasswordAgent offers the additional security with random salts, so even a broken
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plain-text password will not give an attacker access to a login.
Advanced Phishing Protection: PasswordAgent provides early warning against phishing sites.
If a user attempts to enter a protected password on an unregistered site, an information dialog no-
tifies the user. This dialog, as shown in Figure 6, explains to the user that the current site is not
registered and displays a list of registered sites. This allows users to check if they are on a phishing
site. Through the site label feature, Passpet offers similar warning notifications about phishing as
well. However, if a user ignores the warning and submits a site password, that password can be
used in an offline attack. Because of this issue, Passpet is not as robust as PasswordAgent against
phishing attacks.
Shoulder Surfing Protection: PasswordAgent makes shoulder surfing—watching a user type in
a password—much more difficult to succeed, because it requires the observation of two separate
events, the typing of the Agent password and the typing of the site password. Since the Agent
password is entered only when the user begins a session, an attacker is forced to hover around the
victim for longer periods of time, increasing the chance of detection. Other schemes, however, only
require one password, making the attacker easier to succeed.
Secured Remote Storage: The Salt Repository of PasswordAgent is cryptographically secure,
and does not leak any useful information to attackers. By contrast, Passpet leaks not only whether a
username exists (through the list command) but also how large k1 is [33]. Armed with this knowl-
edge, an attacker can target a user with a small k1 value, and launch a brute force attack on the
weakest master password. Both PasswordAgent and Passpet store only encrypted data and guaran-
tee the integrity of the data with a MAC.
Adaptation to Faster Computers: PasswordAgent can adapt to faster computers, and the asso-
ciated greater power of attackers in launching dictionary/brute force attacks, by increasing the salt
size. This is a minor change to the Agent implementation. The user simply regenerates a longer
salt while keeping the plain-text password intact. The newly-generated site password is stronger,
and no extra memory burden is placed on the user. In contrast, PwdHash does not have the ability
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to adapt to adversaries with more computing power, so its security will degrade with time. Both
Passpet and Password Multiplier can increase the number of iterations to make it harder for an at-
tacker to compute the site password. While this is feasible, it requires the users to update all of their
accounts in order to use the new (stronger) master password, which only compounds the usability
issues analyzed in Section 4.2.
Data Anonymity: Only LPWA has data anonymity as its goal. The other solutions, including Pass-
wordAgent, focus solely on password protection. LPWA enables a user to browse, hold accounts,
and email without ever revealing personally identifying information.
4.2. Additional Usability Benefits
Usability is a key factor in any software system. A simple usability flaw might render a crypto-
graphically secure system useless. Care is taken in the development of PasswordAgent to address
usability concerns and flaws that exist in previous password hashing solutions. The specific usabil-
ity benefits of PasswordAgent are detailed as follows.
Ease of Site Password Updating: PasswordAgent allows users to change their site passwords
exactly like they normally do, via the change password page of the website. By changing it to a new
protected password, users maintain all the benefits of PasswordAgent without any complicated or
confusing processes. PwdHash has the same functionality. In contrast, Password Multiplier forces
users to append information to the domain name being hashed. Not only is this confusing, but it also
forces users to remember what additional information they are using for their logins [13]. Passpet
uses a similar mechanism, in which users can change the label of a site to change the password.
Unlike Password Multiplier though, it remembers the change and does not require additional mem-
orization.
Notification of Protected Sites: Only PasswordAgent and Passpet notify users when a site requires
protected passwords. PasswordAgent displays a “notification bubble”, which informs the user of
the status of the site and how to login, as shown in Figures 5(a) and 5(b). In addition to notifica-
tion bubble, PasswordAgent allows the user to view a list of all the registered sites, a function that
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Passpet lacks. Both PwdHash and Password Multiplier fail to indicate whether a site is expecting
a protected or plain-text password. Users who enter an incorrect password will often proceed to
enter many of their other passwords, including plain-text passwords [13]. This leads to multiple
passwords being exposed, a situation that is even worse than if no password protection is used at all.
Site Specific Password Requirements: Many sites have different password requirements, includ-
ing size and acceptable characters. Only PasswordAgent and PwdHash examine the user’s plain-text
password for clues to the expected composition of a password. Any errors with the plain-text pass-
word are mirrored in the site password, so the user receives useful feedback. Passpet and Password
Multiplier force the user to add custom characters if the password does not meet site requirements.
This is not only an awkward solution, but it is also not clear what the user needs to do, making
registration difficult on those sites that require symbols or punctuation characters in passwords.
Minimal Changes to Browsing Paradigm: PasswordAgent makes only minimal changes to the
normal interaction between a user and a web browser. The only two changes include: (1) the user
must log into the Agent when beginning a session, and (2) the protected password must start with
@@ (or the user must activate PasswordAgent via the F2 key). These minimal changes should make
the adoption of PasswordAgent easy. PwdHash has the same benefits, while Password Multiplier
and Passpet both require significant deviations from the normal user login.
Ease of Switching Storage Servers: PasswordAgent is completely repository agnostic, and can
easily transfer the salt list from one repository to another. In contrast, Passpet uses the storage
server address as part of the master password generation, thus any change in the storage server
address forces users to create a new master password and update all their site passwords.
5. Implementation and Evaluation
5.1. Implementation
We build a prototype of PasswordAgent, which includes the Salt Repository implemented as a
Java servlet and the Agent implemented as a Firefox extension.
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Method Description Parameters Data Section Format
CreateUser Creates a new
user account.
user - the desired username.
password - the desired repository password.
hmac - the HMAC code to store for the current (empty) salt
list
N/A
GetSites Retrieves the salt
list for a user.
user - the username of the user.
password - the repository password of the user
<data hmac=“SaltListHMAC”>
<site domain=“domain.com” salt=“salt” />
<site domain=“domain2.com” salt=“salt2” />
...
</data>
SetSite Stores a salt for a
specified domain.
user - the username.
password - the repository password.
site - the domain
salt - the new salt
hmac - the HMAC code to store for the current (including
this updated entry) salt list
N/A
UpdateUser Updates a user’s
repository pass-
word.
user - the username.
password - the repository password.
newpassword - the desired new authentication password.
N/A
Table 3: Salt Repository methods.
5.1.1. Salt Repository Interface
The Salt Repository Interface is a simple XML-based REST-style protocol, which allows the cre-
ation of user accounts, the updating of site salts, and the retrieval of the salt list. These methods,
which are listed in Table 3, fulfill the minimum requirements to maintain a salt list.
The Salt Repository Interface was designed for ease of use with Javascript’s XMLHTTPRequest
object. Because the XMLHTTPRequest object allows synchronous HTTPS requests and can trans-
late an XML response into a DOM document it takes minimal additional code for the Agent to
communicate with the Repository. This also gains the added benefit of performing most of the
communcation using native code (which XMLHTTPRequest is written in) instead of Javascript.
A Salt Repository can be run on any publicly accessible HTTPS server. We chose to implement
our Repository as a Java servlet in order guarantee cross-platform support and ease of deployment.
For environments where Java servlets are not an option, implementing the Interface in another lan-
guage is trivial. The only requirement, besides implementing the Salt Repository Interface, is that
the Repository must be accessable via passwordagent.domain. This requirement allows the browser
plugin to contact the correct Repository, given only a username in the form of user@domain.
5.1.2. Agent
The Agent is a Firefox extension written in Javascript and XML User Interface Language (XUL)
[11], without using native components. It is a modified version of the open source PwdHash. While
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the basic password protection activation code remains the same, additional functionality is pro-
vided in the form of a GUI, a more secure hash function, and a module to communicate with the
Salt Repository. PwdHash has no visible GUI, PasswordAgent, by contrast, includes status indi-
cators and warning dialogs to assist users in protecting their passwords. PwdHash uses the MD5
hash function, but recent collision attacks have rendered MD5 insecure [30]. PasswordAgent uses
SHA256 for all hashing functions and AES for salt encryption. Although PasswordAgent uses a
more complex hash algorithm and hashes larger values 1, it is still reasonably efficient as it takes
only about 45ms to generate a password using SHA256, benchmarked on a 2.26Ghz Intel machine
running SuSE Linux 10.2 with 512MB RAM.
5.2. Evaluation
We focus our evaluation on the usability of PasswordAgent, which is a key measure determining
whether a password manager is really useful or even secure [13]. We choose user studies, i.e.,
laboratory user tests [27, 31], to assess the usability of PasswordAgent. We select PwdHash for
a direct comparison with PasswordAgent. This is because both use the same activation method,
and PwdHash scores higher than Password Multiplier on perceived security and usability [13]. In
the design our usability tests, we follow a similar approach to the usability study on PwdHash and
Password Multiplier [13].
5.2.1. Participants
There are 28 individuals ranging in age from 17 to 63 years old participated in the user study. Only
one of the participants is a computer science major. None of the participants has any particular
experience with computer security. A pre-task questionnaire, identical to the one in [13], is used
to survey participants’ initial attitude towards password security. The questions and responses are
summarized in Table 4. We can see that only 42.9% of participants choose “difficult for others to
guess” passwords, only 4% of participants do not reuse passwords across different websites, and
only one participant has ever used software to manage passwords. A useful password generation
tool would resolve the security issues caused by these poor password practices.
1PwdHash only hashes a domain name and a password, while PasswordAgent hashes a 256-bit salt and a password.
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Question People Responding “Yes”
Do you sometimes reuse passwords on different sites? 96.4% (27)
Are you concerned about the security of passwords? 28.6% (8)
Criteria for choosing passwords:
Easy to remember 75.0% (21)
Difficult for others to guess 42.9% (12)
Suggested by a system 0% (0)
Same as another password 57.1% (16)
Other 10.7% (3)
Participation in online activities requiring personal or financial details:
Online purchases 75% (21)
Online banking 75% (21)
Online bill payments 28.6% (8)
Other activities 42.9% (12)
Do you use:
A password manager? 3.6% (1)
A password generation tool? 0% (0)
Table 4: Participants’ initial attitude towards password security.
5.2.2. Tasks
Each participant is asked to complete a set of tasks using two password generation plugins: Pass-
wordAgent and PwdHash. The tasks are completed on two personal computers, designated A and
B. Both computers run SUSE Linux and Mozilla Firefox. Computer A serves as the participants’
primary computer, while Computer B is used to let participants install and use plugins from a com-
puter other than their primary machine. Five tasks are carefully selected to reflect the realistic daily
usage of a password generation plugin:
• Migrate Login : From computer A, logging on to a website W (Yahoo) with an account that
has not yet been protected, migrating the account, and getting the password protected by the
plugin. This task simulates taking an existing account and protecting it with the plugin.
• Log Into Site : From computer A, logging on to a website W (Google) with an account that
has already been protected by the plugin. This task simulates a user’s regular login process
using protected accounts.
• Update Password : From computer A, logging on to the website W (Hotmail) with a pro-
tected account, and changing its password. This task simulates the process of changing the
password of a protected account.
• Second Login : From computer A, logging on to a website W (Hotmail) with the protected
account whose password has just been updated in “Update Password”. This task simulates
22
Task PasswordAgent PwdHash
Success Dangerous
Success
Failures Success Dangerous
Success
Failures
Failure False
Com-
pletion
Failed
Previous
Failure False
Com-
pletion
Failed
Previous
Migrate Login 92.9%
(26)
0% (0) 7.1% (2) 0% (0) 0% (0) 75%
(21)
14.3%
(4)
10.7% (3) 0% (0) 0% (0)
Log Into Site 96.4%
(27)
0% (0) 3.6% (1) 0% (0) 0% (0) 89.3%
(25)
10.7%
(3)
0% (0) 0% (0) 0% (0)
Update Password 96.4%
(27)
0% (0) 3.6% (1) 0% (0) 0% (0) 67.8%
(19)
14.3%
(4)
17.9% (5) 0% (0) 0% (0)
Second Login 96.4%
(27)
0% (0) 0% (0) 0% (0) 3.6% (1) 75%
(21)
7.1% (2) 0% (0) 0% (0) 17.9%
(5)
Remote Login 82.1%
(23)
0% (0) 17.9% (5) 0% (0) 0% (0) 46.4%
(13)
28.6%
(8)
25% (7) 0% (0) 0% (0)
Table 5: Task completion results for PasswordAgent and PwdHash.
the process of logging in with updated passwords.
• Remote Login : From computer B, logging on to the website W (Amazon) with a protected
account. This task simulates when users log in from remote machines that do not have the
plugin installed.
Each task is performed with PwdHash and PasswordAgent. Participants are given a simple in-
struction sheet, which instructs them on how to use PwdHash and Password Agent. They are allowed
to refer to the instructions whenever necessary. Accounts are created for the purpose of the usability
tests, instead of having the participants use their personal accounts.
5.2.3. Results
Results are collected through both observation and questionnaires. A single experimenter observes
the test session of each participant and records the results. The experimenter does not provide
additional instructions to a participant during the test session. The observed outcome of each task
is classified into one of five groups: successful, i.e., the participant completes the task without a
problem; dangerous success, i.e., the participant completes the task after an attempt that may lead
to a security exposure; failed, i.e., the participant cannot complete the task and gives up; false
completion, i.e., the participant erroneously thinks that the task has been correctly completed, when
it has not; and failed due to previous, i.e., the participant does not complete this task due to the
failure of previous task(s). Because these classifications are objective, only a single experimenter is
needed to observe the experiment. Table 5 lists the task completion results for PasswordAgent and
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Perceived Security
My passwords are secure when using PasswordAgent.
I do not trust PasswordAgent to protect my passwords from cyber criminals.
Comfort Level with Giving Control of Passwords to a Program
I am uncomfortable with not knowing my actual passwords for a website.
Passwords are safer when users do not know their actual passwords.
Perceived Ease of Use
PasswordAgent is difficult to use.
I could easily log on to web sites and manage my passwords with PasswordAgent.
Perceived Necessity and Acceptance
I need to use PasswordAgent on my computer to protect my passwords.
My passwords are safe even without PasswordAgent.
Table 6: Post-task Questionnaire (for PasswordAgent, the questionnaire for PwdHash was identical other
than the name of the software).
PwdHash. We can see that PasswordAgent achieves an over 90% success ratio for four tasks, and
meanwhile it outperforms PwdHash in all the five tasks.
After completing the tasks for a plugin, each user answers a questionnaire for that plugin. The
questionnaire consists of eight Likert scale [5, 24] statements. The participants are asked to indicate
their degree of agreement with each statement after they finish the tasks. We use a five-point Likert
scale: strongly disagree, disagree, neutral, agree, and strongly agree. The questionnaire statements,
which are identical to the ones in [13] are listed in Table 6. A summary of the results are shown
in Figure 7. The questionnaire focuses on four different categories: Perceived Security, Perceived
Comfort, Perceived Ease of Use, and Perceived Necessity and Acceptance. PasswordAgent scores
higher than PwdHash in all four measurements. T-tests are used to determine the statistical sig-
nificance of the differences in scores. The t-test results show that PasswordAgent is easier to use
than PwdHash (t = 2.29, p = 0.026 < 0.05), while there are no significant differences between
PasswordAgent and PwdHash on the other three categories of measures.
The perception that PasswordAgent is easier to use than PwdHash corresponds with fewer se-
curity breaches stemming from usability problems. The reduction in the number of failures and
dangerous successes demonstrate that PasswordAgent is more secure in real world situations. Both
advantages stem from PasswordAgent’s user interface which is designed to provide useful feedback
as to how passwords are being altered. PwdHash lacks any interface at all, and because of this is
unable to inform the user how to safely interact with websites.
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Figure 7: Mean questionnaire responses for each question group on scale of 1 to 5 (1 most negative, 3 neutral,
5 most positive).
6. Limitations
In this section, we discuss two limitations in PasswordAgent: the reliance on Salt Repository and
the usability limitation. The Salt Repository is an important part of the PasswordAgent solution.
Should it become unavailable (because of server issues, network problems, or DOS attacks), the
user would be unable to log into any protected site. However, it is possible to use the Salt Repository
as a backup, if the user’s primary computer stores the salt list and then mirrors any changes to the
Repository. This can achieve high reliability, but would come at a security cost. If the primary
computer is compromised, the salt list has a higher chance of being exposed than before.
A user must activate the password protection by using @@ (the F2 key, or some other means).
This is the main usability limitation that is common to PwdHash, Password Multiplier, and Pass-
wordAgent. This extra activation step may make some users feel inconvenienced. Moreover, if
a user forgets to invoke the protection, this limitation may lead to security exposures because the
user’s plain-text password might be sent to a phishing site [13]. Although the inconvenience still
exists, the security risks caused by this limitation is eliminated in PasswordAgent. A phisher cannot
obtain the correct site password since the salt is not accessible to the phisher.
7. Conclusion
We have presented PasswordAgent, a new password hashing mechanism that utilizes both a Salt
Repository and a browser plug-in Agent to provide a convenient secure password protection service.
Without altering the normal interaction between a user and a login form, PasswordAgent secures
the user’s plain-text password by rendering a unique site password for each website visited. Un-
der our stronger security guarantee, a user’s site password is robustly defended against password
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cracking and theft. We have implemented a prototype of PasswordAgent and conducted usability
experiments. The evaluation results clearly indicate the usability benefits of PasswordAgent.
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